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Abstract
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar el efecto de la reciente re-
forma de la Seguridad Social en la prestacio´n pu´blica de jubilacio´n. Las
principales medidas que han afectado al ca´lculo de la prestacio´n son:
1) extensio´n de la edad de jubilacio´n de 65 a 67 an˜os, 2) cambio en el
nu´mero de bases de cotizacio´n requeridas para el ca´lculo, 3) cambio en
el factor de ponderacio´n asociado a los an˜os cotizados en el momento
de la jubilacio´n y 4) cambio en las reglas de jubilacio´n anticipada.
El estudio distingue tres grupos de pensionistas y hace una com-
parativa entre la pensio´n anterior (pensio´n de referencia) y la pensio´n
calculada con la nueva legislacio´n. La disminucio´n en la prestacio´n
pu´blica de jubilacio´n oscila entre el 0 % y 16 % en funcio´n del salario y
de los an˜os de cotizacio´n en el momento de la jubilacio´n.
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyse the effect of the recent Social
Security reform on public retirement benefits. The main measures af-
fecting the calculation of pensions are: 1) extension of the retirement
age from 65 to 67 years, 2) changes in covered earnings of the retirement
pension, 3) changes in the weighting factor associated with the number
of years of contributions to the system at date of retirement and 4)
changes in the early retirement rules.
The study distinguishes three group of pensioners and compares be-
tween previous pension (benchmark pension) and the pension calculated
under the new legislation. The reduction in public retirement benefits
ranges between 0% and 16% depending on wages and the number of
years of contributions at the time of retirement.
Keywords: Public retirement pension, Social Security reforms
JEL: H55, J62
1 Introduction
The Spanish Parliament passed last August a law1 reforming the country’s
Social Security system.
The reform is the final outcome of the agreement signed between the Spa-
nish government, representatives of employers and the main unions on Februa-
ry 2nd, 2011. It focuses on parametric changes to the Social Security system.
The aim was to ensure the long-term sustainability of the public Social Security
system taking into account the demographic challenge: an ageing population,
an decreasing rate of fertility, an increasing old-age dependency ratio, and the
changing age composition of the population.
Many researchers have made projections about the relationship between
pension expenditure and GDP, under different methodologies and making a
range of assumptions (see Jimeno, 2000; Alonso-Meseguer and Herce, 2003;
Del Br´ıo and Gonza´lez, 2004; Da-Rocha and Lores, 2005; Balmaseda et al.,
2006; Gil et al., 2007; Jimeno et al., 2008; Dı´az-Gime´nez and Dı´az Saavedra,
2009; Va´zquez, 2010; Moral-Arce et al., 2010). They have analysed different
parametric measures seeking a sustainable system. Other researchers, however,
have advocated the implementation of structural measures (see Vidal-Melia´ et
al., 2009).
The aim of these papers has been to analyse the system is sustainability.
However in this analysis the main actor is the pensioner rather than the global
system. In that sense, our aim is closer to that of Sarasa (2008), in a study
that seeks to determine the extent to which previous reforms have increased
the risk of poverty among the elderly.
We focus our the attention on the consequences for the retirement pensio-
ners of four specific measures: 1) the extension of the retirement age from 65 to
67 years, 2) changes in covered earnings of the retirement pension, 3) changes
in the weighting factor associated with the number of years of contributions
to the system and 4) changes in the early retirement rules. The study focuses
on the General Scheme because it represents 72% of all of Spain’s retirement
pensions.
We are interested in how the different parametric measures affect income
when employees retire. The new pension and the new gross theoretical pen-
1Ley 27/2011, de 1 de agosto, sobre actualizacio´n, adecuacio´n y modernizacio´n del sis-
tema de Seguridad Social (BOE number 184, August 2nd, 2011 and errata in BOE number
240, October 5th).
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sion replacement rate2 are analysed and their reductions are quantified. We
introduce a more general concept: the variation in public retirement benefits
that reflects the variation in the retirement pension due to the application of
the parametric measures plus the loss of two years’ pension.
In general, the implementation of a reform is gradual and, therefore, a
transitional period is opened up to develop the new measures. However, in
this paper we assume the new legislation to be fully developed in order to
evaluate its effect.
We have quantified the reduction in public retirement benefits and we con-
clude that the variation is between 0% to 16% depending on wages, the number
of years of contributions at the time of retirement and the retirement age. The
reduction is most marked in the pensions of those in the lowest wage bracket
and with fewest contribution to the scheme.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the benchmark pen-
sion obtained under the previous legislation. Section 3 introduces the parame-
tric measures adopted. Section 4 describes the methodology applied. Section
5 quantifies the effect on the retirement pension, on the theoretical replace-
ment rate and on the reduction in the public retirement benefits for the three
collectives selected. Section 6 concludes.
2 The benchmark pension
The benchmark pension is calculated under the retirement rules governing
since 1985 and the changes introduced by the 1997 reform and 2002, 2007
amendments.
The ordinary retirement pension requires contributions to have been made
to the Social Security system for at least 15 years, of which at least two should
be within the 15 years prior to retirement.
The monthly pension is the product of three variables:
1. Earnings during the last 180 months before the date of retirement (BRt).
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2ISG Report states that theoretical replacement rates provide the possibility to look at
individual case studies and evaluate to what extent current and future pension systems
ensure that the elderly have the resources to support adequate standards of living.
3Known as the Base Reguladora.
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2. Weighting factor associated with number of years contributing to the
system at the date of retirement (βt). It is given by a piecewise linear
function.
3. Early retirement factor at date of retirement (µt)
4.
Then, we can state:
RetPenst = βt · µt ·BRt (1)
where,
t : Date of retirement
RetPenst : Monthly retirement pension at t
βt : Weighting factor associated with number of years contributing to the system at t
βt =

0 if Ct < 15
0.5 + 0.03 · (Ct − 15) if 15 ≤ Ct < 25
0.8 + 0.02 · (Ct − 25) if 25 ≤ Ct < 35
1 if Ct ≥ 35
where,
Ct : number of years contributing at t
(2)
µt : Weighting factor associated with early retirement at t
µt = [1− 0.08 · (x− xe)]
where,
x : ordinary retirement age in years
xe : early retirement age in years
(3)
BRt : 180 monthly covered earnings before t
BRt =
∑24
i=1
BCi+
∑180
i=25
BCi·CA(i,25)
210
where,
(4)
4Voluntary early retirement is available from age 60 for people entering the system before
1/1/1967. In this case, the pension is reduced 8% for each year by which the date of
retirement is brought forward.
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BCi : Contribution base at month i-th, for
i = {1, 2, · · · 180}
CA(i, 25) : Updating coefficient contribution bases
from month i − th to month 25 − th
The contribution base, BCi, is limited yearly depending on the level at
which the worker is included in the General Scheme. The contribution base
is limited yearly by a maximum contribution level BCmaxi and by a minimum
level BCmini .
BCmini ≤ BCi ≤ BCmaxi
The expression (1) is replaced by:
RetPenst = βt · µt ·
∑24
i=1BCi +
∑180
i=25BCi · CA(i, 25)
210
(5)
Also, the retirement pension cannot be higher than a limited yearly amount
RetPens
max
t nor can it be lower than a limited yearly amount RetPens
min
t .
RetPenst =

RetPens
min
t if RetPenst <Ret Pens
min
t
βt · µt ·BRt if RetPensmint <Ret Penst <Ret Pensmaxt
RetPens
max
t if RetPenst >Ret Pens
max
t
The yearly amount is 14 times the monthly pension.
In 2012 the pension is being calculated as the benchmark pension. This will
be followed by a transitional period that will be completed at the beginning
of 2027.
3 The parametric reform
The main parametric reform of the new law passed last August 2011 is analysed
in the following order:
1. Extension of the retirement age from 65 to 67 years.
2. Changes in covered earnings to calculate the retirement pension.
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3. Changes in the weighting factor associated with number of years con-
tributing to the system at date of retirement.
4. Changes to the early retirement rules.
3.1 Measure 1: Extension of the ordinary retirement
age
The ordinary retirement age before the reform was 65 years (x = 65). To
keep the ordinary retirement age at 65 years with the application of the new
law (xm = 65), the employee must have contributed to the system for at least
38 years and six months on retiring. Otherwise he must wait until he is 67
(xm = 67). This means that there are people who can retire at 65 while others
must wait until they are 67.
3.2 Measure 2: Changes to the BRt to calculate the
pension
The change in the formula means having to increase the number of monthly
contribution bases from 180 to 300. Therefore (4) is replaced by:
BRmt =
∑24
i=1BCi +
∑300
i=25BCi · CA(i, 25)
350
(6)
where,
BRmt : Covered earnings in the last 300 months before the date of retirement
BCi : Contribution base at month i-th ∀ i = {1, 2, · · · 300}
CA(i, 25) : Updating coefficient contribution bases from month i-th
to month 25-th
3.3 Measure 3: Changes to βt associated with period of
contributions
The weighting factor associated with the number of years contributing to the
system on retirement in expression (2) is modified. The pension will increase
0.19% for each additional month to 15 years contributed during 247 months.
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The increment in the 248 − th additional month will be 0.18% in order to
obtain 100% of the pension. Therefore expression (2) is replaced by:
βmt =

0 if Cmt < 180
0.5 + 0.0019 · (Cmt − 180) if 180 ≤ Cmt < 428
0.9712 + 0.0018 · (Cmt − 428) if 428 ≤ Cmt < 444
1 if Cmt ≥ 444
(7)
where,
βmt : Modified weighting factor associated with number of months contributing at t
Cmt : Number of months contributing at t
The comparative plot of expressions (2) and (7) is:
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As we can observe Figure 1, if the number of years spent contributing is
less than 37, the modified weighting factor is always below the one under the
previous legislation.
3.4 Measure 4: Changes to µt associated with voluntary
early retirement
The new requirements for voluntary retirement are: a) being at least 63 years
old and b) having contributed to the system for at least 33 years. The reduction
in the pension will be based on the quarters that remain to reach the legal
retirement age. Expression (3) is modified by:
µmt =

(1− 0.01875 · T ) if Cmt
12
< 38.5
(1− 0.01625 · T ) if Cmt
12
≥ 38.5
(8)
where,
µmt : Modified early retirement factor at t
Cmt : Contributed months at time t
T : Number of quarters that remain to reach the legal retirement age
There is a limit in the pension defined by:
RetPenst =

RetPens
min
t if RetPens
m
t <Ret Pens
min
t
βmt · µmt ·BRmt if RetPensmint <Ret Pensmt <Ret Pensmaxt
RetPens
max
t · (1− 0.0025 · T ) if RetPensmt >Ret Pensmaxt · (1− 0.0025 · T )
The comparative plot of expressions (3) and (8) is:
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Until now we have considered the effect of each of the four measures adopted
in the new law separately. Now, the combination of these measures transforms
expression (1) into:
RetPens
m
t = β
m
t · µmt ·BRmt (9)
4 Methodology applied to quantify the effect
of the reform
In order to quantify the combined effect of all the measures that constitute in
the reformed retirement law, we follow four steps:
1. Three collectives are distinguished depending on the time that they have
contributed to the system at retirement date.
2. New pension and new gross theoretical pension replacement rate are
calculated in order to be compared with the previous legislation.
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3. The variation of the public retirement pension, in relative terms, is anal-
ysed. At this point, we introduce a more general concept, namely the
variation in the public retirement benefits.
4. The new rules regarding early retirement are used to maintain the re-
tirement age at 65 years under certain constraints.
STEP 1: We divide the collective into three groups depending on the
length of time spent contributing to the system:
a) Collective 1: Employees with Ct ≥ 38.5 years at 65.
b) Collective 2: Employees with 35 ≤ Ct < 38.5 years at 65.
c) Collective 3: Employees with 25 ≤ Ct < 35 years at 65.
Collective 1: People who have contributed to the system for at least 38
years and 6 months when they reach 65 years. The retirement age for this
group is 65 years under both laws (x = xm = 65). No reduction coefficient is
applied in the formula for contributions to the retirement years (βt = β
m
t = 1)
and the factor associated with early retirement is not involved (µt = µ
m
t = 1).
The only difference lies in the determination of the BRmt (BR
m
t 6= BRt).
• Sub-collective 1.1: Not affected by maximum pension
• Sub-collective 1.2: Affected by maximum pension
Measure 2 affects Collective 1.
Collective 2: People who have contributed to the system for more than
35 years and less than 38 years and 6 months when they reach 65 years. The
new pension of this second group is different in two aspects to the benchmark
pension: first, the ordinary retirement age at 67 years (xm = 67) and, second,
the formula for calculating the BRmt (BR
m
t 6= BRt).
The fact of increasing the retirement age to 67 years has the collateral
effect of increasing the contributions to the system to 37 years (βmt = βt = 1).
Moreover, until now the factor associated with early retirement has not been
involved(µmt = µt = 1).
• Sub-collective 2.1: Not affected by maximum pension
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• Sub-collective 2.2: Affected by maximum pension
Measures 1 and 2 affect Collective 2.
However, this collective can retire at 65 if they fulfil the requirements esta-
blished for early retirement (at least 63 years of age and 33 years contributing
to the system) and described in the previous section.
In this case, measure 2 (BRmt 6= BRt), measure 3 (βmt 6= βt; βmt < 1) and
measure 4 (µmt 6= µt; µmt < 1) affect Collective 2.
Collective 3: People who have contributed to the system for more than
25 years and less than 35 years when they reach 65 years. The differences
between the two pensions are due to all three factors: new retirement age
(xm = 67), the formula for calculating the BRmt (BR
m
t 6= BRt), and the
factor associated with the contributions to the system at the age retirement
age (βmt 6= βt; βmt < 1)
• Sub-collective 3.1: Not affected by maximum pension
• Sub-collective 3.2: Affected by maximum pension
Measures 1, 2 and 3 affect Collective 3.
Part of this collective can retire at 65 age too if they fulfil the requirements
established at early retirement (only if they have contributed to the system for
33 or 34 years). In this case all the measures affect the collective: measure 1,
measure 2, measure 3 and measure 4. For this collective we focus on workers
that have to wait until they are 67.
STEP 2: We project the monthly pension at the age of retirement ac-
cording to expressions (1) and (9) for different annual wage levels today and
considering different numbers of years contributing to the Social Security sys-
tem.
The retirement date occurs after the transitional period has terminated
and the new legislation is fully developed.
The annual wage levels today analysed in the present study are related
with:
a) Inter-professional minimum wage5.
59,000 euros for 2011.
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b) Spanish average wage6.
c) Maximum retirement pension7.
d) Maximum contribution base8.
e) A wage above the maximum contribution base9.
A set of hypotheses are necessary to project the pensions. We highlight
the following:
1. The contribution base is taken to be the total wage. It is limited yearly
by a maximum contribution level BCmaxi and by a minimum level BC
min
i .
2. Consumer price index (cpi) is estimated to be 2%. It is necessary to
project growth in pensions, maximum contribution bases, etc.
3. Growth in wages (w) is estimated to be 3%.
4. Interest discount rate (i) is estimated to be 4%.
5. Mortality table used is that of the Social Security to calculate retirement
capital cost.10
The projected monthly pension is calculated according to the previous
legislation (RetPenst) and to the new one (RetPens
m
t ). We take into account
the maximum and minimum annual pension amounts in this calculation. In
the case of the minimum pension, the Spanish legislation considers two cases
depending on whether the pensioner has a spouse with earnings or not. We
have taken the first case.
Other important information is the gross theoretical pension replacement
rate in both cases. This variable is defined as the level of public pension as
a percentage of previous individual earnings at the moment of taking up the
pension for a hypothetical worker. It measures the variation in living standards
when a typical worker retires.
6National Statistics Institute. Spanish Statistical Office reports of 22,500 euros for 2009.
We have worked with 25,000 euros for 2011.
735,000 euros for 2011.
838,000 euros for 2011.
960,000 euros for 2011.
10Orden TAS/4045/2005 of 27th December 2005. BOE 310.(28/12/2005).
13
The gross theoretical pension replacement rate is expressed as TPRRt =
RetPenst
Wt
if it is calculated with the benchmark pension and as TPRRmt =
RetPens
m
t
Wt
when calculated with the new pension. Wt is the last monthly salary
before retirement date.
STEP 3: In a first stage, we take the pension variation in absolute terms:
4retPenst =Ret Penst −Ret Pensmt
At this point, it should be noted that at certain times we compare the
pension calculated at 65 (for example, the benchmark pension) and the pension
calculated at 67 years. To make this possible from a financial point of view,
we estimate the pension calculated at 65, two years later using the estimated
cpi.
To compare the effect, we express the pension variation in relative terms:
4retPenst
RetPenst
(10)
In a second stage, we consider that, in the case of retirement at 67 years
instead of 65, the employee extends his employment life by two years while
his life as a pensioner is reduced by two years with the same life expectancy.
This loss of pension income during two years is not considered in the previous
variable and for this reason we introduce a more general concept, the variation
in public retirement benefits (4PRBt).
This new variable reflects the variation in retirement pensions due to the
application of parametric measures plus the loss of two years’ pension. The
actuarial value at 65 years of the two streams of pension payments is used to
quantify the variable.
Actuarial value at t of the annual stream of pension payments under pre-
vious legislation is expressed as:
PRBt =
h−x∑
j=0
RetPenst+j · 14 · (1 + i)−j ·j px
where:
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t : Date of retirement
RetPenst+j · 14 : Annual retirement pension at t+ j under the previous legislation
h : Limiting age of mortality table
x : Retirement age under the previous legislation
i : Interest discount rate
jpx : Probability of surviving j years at age x obtained from
Social Security mortality table
Expression of actuarial value at t of the annual stream of pension payments
under the new legislation is:
PRBmt =
h−xm∑
j=0
RetPens
m
t+j · 14 · (1 + i)−j ·j pxm
where:
t : Date of retirement
RetPens
m
t+j · 14 : Annual retirement pension at t+ j under the new legislation
h : Limiting age of mortality table
xm : Retirement age under the new legislation
i : Interest discount rate
jpxm : Probability of surviving j years at age x
m obtained from
Social Security mortality table
We take the variation in public retirement benefits in absolute terms at 65
years:
4PRBt = PRBt − PRBmt · (1 + i)−(x
m−x) ·xm−x px
To compare the effect, we express the variation in public retirement benefits
relative terms:
4PRBt
PRBt
(11)
STEP 4: We calculate expressions (1) and (9) to evaluate the effect of
maintaining the retirement age under the new conditions of voluntary early
retirement. The new rules are based on the number of years contributing to
the system at the time of application and the quarters remaining until ordinary
retirement.
15
5 Results
Collective 1:
This group is affected only by changes to the expression that calculates
the BRt of the benchmark pension. The pension is reducing effect is due to
the increase from 15 to 25 years of contributions in the formula and BRt is
replaced by BRmt (measure 2).
The change to the gross theoretical pension replacement rate and the varia-
tion in public retirement pension in relative terms and for different salaries are
summarised in Table 1.
Table 1: Collective 1. Ordinary retirement age: 65 years
Collective W2011 TPRRt → TPRRmt 4retPenstretPenst
Annual
1.1. 9, 000 90.72%→ 86.46% −4.70%
1.1. 22, 500 90.72%→ 86.46% −4.70%
1.1. 25, 000 90.72%→ 86.46% −4.70%
1.2. 35, 000 83.82%→ 83.82% 0%
1.2. 38, 000 77.21%→ 77.21% 0%
1.2. 60, 000 48.90%→ 48.90% 0%
The gross theoretical pension replacement rate calculated for the average
wage and lower (sub-collective 1.1) is around 91%11. However, as we can see in
the table, for employees affected by limited contribution bases (sub-collective
1.2), the replacement rate decreases as the wage increases. The difference
is between 77% and 49%. In these cases, employees must complement their
retirement pension with private products in order to maintain their standard
of living.
With the application of measure 2, we see that the public pension falls
4.7%, while the effect of applying the legislative reform is void for wages above
the maximum retirement pension.
11According to the percentage reported for the Spanish Case in the annex to the ISG
report on theoretical replacement rates (2009).
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Collective 2:
This group is affected by the change to the BRt too. BRt is replaced by
BRmt as in collective 1 (measure 2). In collective 2 we can distinguish cases
where employees must delay retirement by two years (xm = 67) (measure 1)
and cases in which the retirement age is maintained at 65 years (xm = 65)
since the conditions for early retirement are satisfied (measure 4).
In Table 2 are shown the results in the case of a delay to the retirement.
Table 2: Collective 2. Ordinary retirement age: 67 years
Collective W2011 TPRRt → TPRRmt 4retPenstretPenst
Annual
2.1. 9, 000 88.97%→ 86.45% −2.83%
2.1. 22, 500 88.97%→ 86.45% −2.83%
2.1. 25, 000 88.97%→ 86.45% −2.83%
2.2. 35, 000 82.20%→ 82.20% 0%
2.2. 38, 000 75.71%→ 75.71% 0%
2.2. 60, 000 47.95%→ 47.95% 0%
For this collective, the gross theoretical pension replacement rate calculated
with the benchmark pension decreases slightly with respect to collective 1. On
the other hand, the amount of pension at 67 years is higher than two years
earlier, thus counteracting part of the decrease generated by the number of
years contributing to the system required in the BRmt formula. This is why the
decrease in sub-collective 2.1 is less than that in sub-collective 1.1. However,
sub-collective 2.2 is not affected, as was also the case of sub-collective 1.2.
Under this scenario, we observe that the pension decrease and the change
in gross theoretical pension replacement obtained in Table 2 do not reflect the
fact that the pensioner is receiving two years less retirement pension. At this
point, we introduce the variation in public retirement benefits in relative terms
(
4PRBt
PRBt
). Each stream finishes at the limiting age in the mortality table. The
results obtained are shown in Table 3.
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Table 3: Collective 2. Ordinary retirement age: 67 years
Collective W2011
4PRBt
PRBt
Annual
2.1. 9, 000 −12.02%
2.1. 22, 500 −12.02%
2.1. 25, 000 −12.02%
2.2. 35, 000 −9.45%
2.2. 38, 000 −9.45%
2.2. 60, 000 −9.45%
Under this new scenario, sub-collective 2.1 and sub-collective 2.2 are affec-
ted by the new law. The effect of the application of parametric measures plus
the loss of two years’ pension is a reduction in public retirement benefits for
the pensioner. As we can appreciate, the percentage of decrease is considerable
in both cases.
Finally, for collective 2, we study the effect on the retirement pension if the
employee decides to retire at 65 years under the early retirement conditions
aware that they are highly exacting. In this case, Table 2 is replaced by Table
4.
Table 4: Collective 2. Early retirement age: 65 years
Collective W2011 TPRRt → TPRRmt 4retPenstretPenst
2.1. 9, 000 90.72%→ 77.45% −14.62%∗
2.1. 22, 500 90.72%→ 76.19% −16.02%
2.1. 25, 000 90.72%→ 76.19% −16.02%
2.2. 35, 000 83.82%→ 75.19% −10.30%
2.2. 38, 000 77.21%→ 72.16% −6.54%
2.2. 60, 000 48.90%→ 46.43% −5.04%
(*) Minimum pension is applied in this case.
As we can appreciate, maintaining the retirement age, if the employee
is eligible for early retirement, punishes the pensioner with the receipt of a
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lesser amount of retirement pension. In this scenario sub-collective 2.1 and
sub-collective 2.2 are affected. The difference, if we compare with Table 2, is
substantial.
In the following table, we summarize the effect of the new law on the
public retirement benefit of a employee that belongs to collective 2 when the
retirement age is: xm = 67 and xm = 65.
Table 5: Collective 2. Reduction in public retirement benefits
W2011 Collective
4PRBt
PRBt
4PRBt
PRBt
xm = 67 xm = 65
ordinary early
2.1 9, 000 −12.02% −14.62%
2.1 22, 500 −12.02% −16.02%
2.1 25, 000 −12.02% −16.02%
2.2 35, 000 −9.55% −10.30%
2.2 38, 000 −9.45% −6.54%
2.2. 60, 000 −9.45% −5.04%
Collective 3:
This group is affected by the change in the BRt formula, which is replaced
by BRmt (measure 2), by the change in the ordinary retirement age x, which
is replaced by xm (measure 1) and finally, by the change in the weighting
factor associated with the period of contribution at t βt which is replaced by
βmt (measure 3).
Most cases have no possibility of accessing early retirement at 65 years
since they have not contributed for 33 years. For this reason, we focus on
employees that have to wait until 67 years.
As the number of years contributed to the system increases, the effect of
the reduction in measure 3 weakens. In order to evaluate the effect of measure
3, in the next table we include two cases. The first is when the number of years
contributed at 67 is 27 and the second is when the number of years contributed
at 67 is 36. The range of variation is between −6.04% and −2.99% for yearly
salaries below 35,000 euros and between 5.98% and 0% for wages with a limited
contribution base.
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The weighting factor associated with period of contribution at t (βmt ) plays
an important role when we calculate the gross theoretical pension replacement
rate for collective 3. We note a sizeable difference for the same salary be-
tween the gross theoretical pension replacement rate calculated with 27 years
of contribution and with 36 years of contributions.
Sub-collective 3.1 is affected by the application of the three measures, while
pensions are not modified for part of sub-collective 3.2, namely those that have
contributed for more than 34 years on retiring.
Table 6: Collective 3. Ordinary retirement age: 67 years
Collective W2011 TPRRt → TPRRmt 4retPenstretPenst TPRRt → TPRRmt
4retPenst
retPenst
C67 = 27 C67 = 27 C67 = 36 C67 = 36
3.1. 9, 000 73.00%→ 73.00% 0%∗ 87.18%→ 84.58% −2.99%
3.1. 22, 500 71.17%→ 66.87% −6.04% 87.18%→ 84.58% −2.99%
3.1. 25, 000 71.17%→ 66.87% −6.04% 87.18%→ 84.58% −2.99%
3.2. 35, 000 69.67%→ 65.50% −5.98% 82.20%→ 82.20% 0%
3.2. 38, 000 65.19%→ 62.45% −4.21% 75.71%→ 75.71% 0%
3.2. 60, 000 41.29%→ 39.95% −3.25% 47.95%→ 47.85% 0%
(*) Minimum pension is applied in this case.
As with collective 2, we calculate the reduction in public retirement ben-
efits. We add the reduction in the pensions of Table 6 and the effect of a
two-year loss of pension.
Table 7: Collective 3. Reduction in public retirement benefits
Collective W2011
4PRBt
PRBt
4PRBt
PRBt
C67 = 27 C67 = 33
3.1. 9, 000 −9.04% −11.76%
3.1. 22, 500 −14.54% −11.76%
3.1. 25, 000 −14.54% −11.76%
3.2. 35, 000 −14.48% −9.04%
3.2. 38, 000 −12.87% −9.04%
3.2. 60, 000 −12.00% −9.04%
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We conclude with a table that summarizes the decrease in the public bene-
fits attributable to the reform of the Social Security system for the three collec-
tives.
Table 8: Reduction in public retirement benefits following the reform of the
Social Security system
W2011 Col
4PRBt
PRBt
Col
4PRBt
PRBt
4PRBt
PRBt
Col
4PRBt
PRBt
4PRBt
PRBt
x = 65 x = 67 x = 65 x = 67 x = 67
C67 ≥ 37 C65 ≥ 35 C67 = 27 C67 = 36
9, 000 1.1 −4.7% 2.1 −12.02% −14.62% 3.1 −9.04% −11.76%
22, 500 1.1 −4.7% 2.1 −12.02% −16.02% 3.1 −14.54% −11.76%
25, 000 1.1 −4.7% 2.1 −12.02% −16.02% 3.1 −14.48% −11.76%
35, 000 1.2 0% 2.2 −9.55% −10.30% 3.2 −12.87% −9.04%
38, 000 1.2 0% 2.2 −9.45% −6.54% 3.2 −12.00% −9.04%
60, 000 1.2. 0% 2.2. −9.45% −5.04% 3.2 −10.55% −9.04%
6 Conclusions
The main conclusions that we draw from the study can be summarised as
follows:
With the new legislation, the number of years contributing to the Social
Security system acquires greater importance because it affects not only βt
but also determines the age at which a employee can retire. We distinguish
three types of group and within each we differentiate if they are affected by a
maximum contribution or not.
The variables used to quantify the effect of the reform are the pension
variation in relative terms and the variation in public retirement benefits in
relative terms. This second variable reflects the decrease in the retirement
pension due to the application of parametric measures plus the loss of two
years of pension. We quantify the difference between the actuarial value at t
of the annual stream of benchmark pension payments and the actuarial value
at t of the annual stream of pension payments under the new legislation.
Our aim was to analyse how the reform affect pensioners. We have quan-
tified the reduction in public retirement benefits and we conclude that the
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variation is between 0% to 16% depending on wages, years of contributions at
the time of retirement and retirement age. The reduction is more marked in
the pensions of those in the lowest wage bracket and with fewest contributions
to the system. The results are summarized in Table 8.
The only employees not affected by the implementation of new legislation
are those that can still retire at 65, whose factor of contribution remains at
100% and, who finally, will have contributed to the system an amount that
exceeds the maximum contribution each year for at least 38 years and six
months. The remaining employees will be affected to a greater or lesser extent.
In general, the severity is higher for wages lower or equal to the Spanish average
wage. The impact is larger for smaller wages.
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